Okinawa: A Crack in the Pacific Pivot to Asia by Cooley, Alexander A.
In Okinawa, the complex local politics that surround the U.S. basing presence have
entered an uncertain new phase—one that threatens to derail the new security
consensus held by Tokyo and Washington.
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GINOWAN CITY, OKINAWA—The Obama administration has affirmed its intent to
“pivot” to Asia by concluding new security agreements with the Philippines and Australia.
In Japan, China's provocations over the Senkaku Islands and more aggressive stance
towards South China Sea territorial issues have seemingly strengthened and refocused
the pivot’s linchpin: the U.S.-Japan security partnership. But in Okinawa, the southern
prefecture that hosts 74 percent of U.S. military facilities in Japan, the complex local
politics that surround the U.S. basing presence have entered an uncertain new phase, one
that threatens to derail the new security consensus held by Tokyo and Washington.
Okinawa has long been a source of both principled and patronage-driven opposition to
the U.S. military. Some Okinawans hold sincere antimilitary beliefs, due to the historical
memories of the brutal battle fought there during World War II and the U.S. military's
colonial-style administration from 1952 to 1972 during which it forcibly acquired local
land for base construction. A related recurring complaint is that Tokyo privileges the
political needs of the main islands above the wishes of the remote prefecture’s residents.
But for over forty years, Tokyo has alleviated
Okinawa’s "special base burden" by providing a
wide range of payments, both to compensate
individuals affected by base-related accidents
and pollution, and to subsidize public-works
projects for the regional government and base-
hosting municipalities. In 1995, massive antibase
demonstrations on the island followed the
widely publicized rape of a twelve-year old
schoolgirl by three U.S. service members. In response, Tokyo increased its compensation
packages and, with the agreement of Washington, agreed to close and consolidate some
basing facilities. Chief among them was a plan to relocate Marine Air Station Futenma,
which is surrounded by crowded Ginowan City, to a new facility to be constructed off the
coast of Cape Henoko in the north.
Almost twenty years later, the relocation has not even broken ground and remains mired
in thorny local politics. Okinawans favor closing Futenma, but most do not want scenic
Henoko turned into a massive construction site, while the tsunami that led to the
Fukushima disaster in 2011 has raised additional concerns about the offshore facility’s
vulnerability. Though in late December, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima formally approved
the landfill for the new facility’s perimeter, just a few weeks later Nago City, the
municipality that governs Henoko, decisively elected challenger Susumu Inamine who
triumphed over an incumbent Mayor on a strong anti-relocation platform against the
central and regional government. The issue once again will be central in the new
gubernatorial elections of November that will pick Nakaima’s successor, while forcing the
beginning of construction before the election may spark wide-ranging protests.
Meanwhile, new regional and global developments are further complicating the status of
U.S. bases on the islands.
First, over the last twenty years, Okinawan activists have found transnational allies
through the forces of globalization. Okinawan NGOs and citizens' groups, once isolated,
have networked with similar antibase movements and protest campaigns across the
world, exchanging tactics and raising the international media profile of their campaign.
For example, activists have recruited celebrities and have taken out ads in U.S.
newspapers depicting picturesque photos of Cape Henoko with an appeal to stop the
construction.
Second, though policy makers in Washington and Tokyo have assumed that rising anti-
Chinese attitudes in Okinawa would automatically generate stronger support for the
basing presence, countertrends are also observable. A now widely cited opinion poll
commissioned by the regional government from 2013 found that while Okinawan
residents, indeed, have adopted unfavorable views of China at or even higher than the
rest of Japan, Okinawans also believe that there will be an East Asian conflict at more
than double the rate of the national average. But only 10 percent of respondents believe
that, in response, Japan's effective control over territories should be "reinforced," while




Third, while Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has initiated a much-needed national
debate on Japanese identity and security and proposed a constitutional amendment to
expand the role of Japanese self-defense forces, the Okinawan prefecture is
independently promoting itself as a future Asian regional hub in an attempt to lure
investment and tourism under the new “Okinawa 21st Century Vision” campaign. A
newly formed pro-independence party draws on antibase sentiment, while the island’s
media outlets now emphasize the theme of greater autonomy in the island’s foreign
relations.
The sum effect of these global and regional developments is that the traditional levers of
compensation and patronage used by Tokyo may no longer be sufficient to ensure
Okinawan cooperation to implement necessary changes in the force posture, even in the
face of a more aggressive Beijing. The broader lesson is that the U.S. rebalance is taking
place in an era where global information flows and new political networks are creating a
far more unpredictable political and media environment than the traditional domestic
populism and antibase opposition that defense planners have had to cope with in the
past. Successfully managing and responding to these new forces may be just as critical to
the pivot’s success as are the high politics of reaffirming commitments to alliances.
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